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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ARVILLE KENNETH BUTTERFIELD,
Plw:ntif f-A ppcllant,

-vs.JOHN \IV.
'V ARDEX,
UTAH STATE PRISON,

l
Case No.
12849

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEl\IENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
The Appellant, A1Tille Kenneth Butterfield, appeals from a decision in Third Judicial District Court
denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
On December 21, 1971, Arville Kenneth Butterfield filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, alleging that his commitment to the Utah State Prison was
invalid. The matter came on for hearing on February
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24, 1972, before the Honorable Joseph C . .Jeppson,
Judge, who denied the writ on February 24, 1972.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant, Arville Kenneth Butterfield, seeks
a reversal of the decision and judgment below with di·
rections that he be released from the Utah State Prison.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Arville Kenneth Butterfield stood trial for the
crime of incest and was represented at trial by his retained attorney, Dwight L. King. (R. 33, 34) Mr.
Butterfield testified at the hearing on his petition for
a writ of habeas corpus that he told Mr. King that 011
the night of the alleged act he (:Mr. Butterfield) w3s ,
with some people, and Mr. King was informed of the /
names of those persons. (R. 35) l\fr. Butterfield tol1l I
Mr. King that he was at Utah Trade Technical College on the night of the alleged crime with one Robert
Allen and they joined a person named 'Vayne at the
OrientB-1 Cafe and stayed there until 2 :00 a.m. (R. 301
l\Ir. King testified that he had discussed some pos·
sible alibi witnesses with Mr. Butterfield but that lw
recalled no names and no names of witnesses appeared
in his notes. (R. 41, 44) l\Ir. King also stated that he
did not investigate any alibi witnesses (R. 43) and part
of the reason for this was that no date was ever estab·
lished as having been the date of the alleged incest. (R.
41) However, .Mr. King did testify that August 15.
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1!)70, was the date of the alleged act set forth in the
information charging Mr. Butterfield. (R. 42) Mr.
King believed it in the best interest of his client not to
get an exact date of the occuITance of the act. (R. 4.5)
)fr. King ran the defense of insanity even though Mr.
Butterfield denied the incest. (R. 41, 46)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR A \YRIT
OF HABEAS COHPUS BECAUSE APPELLANT V\TAS \VTI'HOUT THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND HIS COMMITMENT AND CONFINEMENT ARE THUS
INVALID.

It is clear that if one does not have the effective
assistance of counsel at trial, the resulting conviction
and judgment can be collaterally attacked . .{Hires i·.
Turner, 22 Utah2d 118, 449 P.2d 291 (1969). In Alires,
this court set forth the standard concerning what "effectiYe assistance of counsel" means as follows:
The requirement [of counsel] is not satisfied
by a sham or pretense of an appearance in the
record by an attorney who manifests no real
concern about the interests of the accused. The
entitlement is to the assistance of a competent
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member of the Bar, who shows a willingness to
identify himself with the interests of the defendant and present such defenses available
under law and ethics of the profession.
22 Utah2d at 121.
This court held in Alires that the failure to be provided
such counsel resulted in a denial of Due Process. The
requirement under Article I, Section 12, of the Utah
Constitution and Amendments VI and XIV of the
United States Constitution that the accused have the
assistance of counsel of course means that one ha,·e the
"effective" assistance of counsel. See Alires v. Turner.
sitpra; Pou: ell t'. Alabama, 287 tT .S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 5.5,
72 L.Ed. 158 ( 1932).

Whether one has been denied the effective assistance of counsel is of course a question of degree and
judgment, and depends on all of the circumsbnces of
the case. 'Vhere an accused is charged with incest, the
question is whether or not the act occurred. There is no
issue as to whether force was used, there is no question
of degree, there is no question of consent, there is no
issue as to specific intent. 'Vhere a defendant claims
as a defense to the charge of incest that he did not do it,
counsel clearly is obligated to investigate such a claim
on behalf of his client. 'Vhen the accused says he
with someone somewhere other than the site of the
crime when the offense allegedly was committed, alibi
witnesses are clearly crucial to that defense. The failrne
of counsel to investigate and call such witnesses ,rhen
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information is furnished by the defendant is wh'lt appellant alleges is responsible for his conviction without
due process of law. Appellant does not allege that trial
counsel made a mistake in trial tactics, but alleges that
the failure to investigate and call alibi witnesses was the
result of lack of preparation and investigation rather
than conscious decision based on trial tactics. Not calling
alibi witnesses as a trial tactic would clearly not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g.,
Fnited States v. Dorn, 169 F. Supp. 144 (D. D.C.
Hl59); and generally 74 A.L.R. 2d 1390.
In Tttiford v. Peyton, 372 P.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1967)
the court decided the question of whether the defendant
was denied the effectiYe assistance of counsel because
the court appointed counsel shortly before trial and a
r·ontinuance to prepare was denied. The plaintiff there
sought a writ of habeas corpus which the district court
denied. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Ciruit
reversed. In that case the court appointed an attorney
the day before trial and then denied a continuance on
defense counsel's motion for further time to prepare.
The court said that a late appointment of counsel is inherently prejudicial and a mere showing constitutes a
prima facie case of denial of effective assistance of
eounsel so that the bur<len of proving lack of prejudice
is shifted to the State. See for the same rule as to the
shifting of the bnrclen, United Staffs, ex. rel. Mathis 1'.
Rundle, 394 F.2d 748 (3rd Cir. 1969).
'\Thile it is true that appellant's case is not factual1>' similar to the Tteiford case, appellant contends if

counsel does not properly investigate witnesses the de-'
fendant is in no better position than if counsel is ap·
pointed the day before trial and thus does not have arle
quate time to properly investigate the case. The criminal defendant does not have any more effecti,'e assistance of counsel if his counsel fails to investigate tha11
if counsel fails to investigate because he was appointe1
late and had no opportunity to investigate. As such.
once the failure to properly investigate is shown, thr
burden, as the court in T·wiford held, shifts to the state'
to show lack of prejudice.
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In TifTilson v. Phend, 417 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.
1969), the defendant's family hired an attorney to de·
fend him. This attorney owned the local newspaper
which carried much pre-trial publicity on the defendant
and the crime of which he was accused. The attorner
failed to move for a change of venue. The retained at·
torney also changed the defendant's plea from "not
guilty" to "not guilty by reason of unsound mind" with·
out consulting with the defendant. He also failed to
present alibi witnesses and did not follow upon
that the defendant claimed would have been exculpatory.
The court held that taken together these facts indicated
that the defendant was convicted \vithout the effectire
a5sistance of counsel. The court reversed the denial of a
writ of habeas corpus and said:
The failure of an attorney to present a defense
or otherwise bring forth important evidence
can be as deleterious in its effects on the fair-
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uess of a trial as any behavior during the actual
litigation. 417 F.2d at 1200.
The court in Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14 (D.C.
Cir. 1946) announced the usual rule that to show ineffective assistance of counsel it must he shown that
the trial was a farce and a mockery of justice, and then
went on to hold that under the facts of that case, the
defendant did not have a "trial" as that term is usually
used. The defendant had given names ancl addresses of
witnesses to his attorney. These witnesses, defendant
said, could have said that the defendant was not guilty
of forgery as he was charged. The attorney refused to
call these witnesses. He also failed to object to a
coerced statement that was introduced at trial and did
not see to it that the jury was given the opportunity of
comparing handwriting specimens after a juror had requested such. The court said that the attorney was not
merely mistaken, but had failed to present the defendant's case in any fundamental respect.
'¥here the attorney did not request H pre-trial motion to suppress evidence of an illegal search and seizure (though he objected at trial), did not subpoena witnesses whom he was told about by the defendant (and
apparently did not even investigate them), and did not
appeal, the court held that these facts required a finding that the defendant was without the effective assistance of counsel, and held the confinement and commitment illegal. Application of Tobisch, 221 F.Supp.
500 (D. Mont. 1963).

8

The fact that appellant retained his own counsel
in this case is not fatal to his claim. As the court in Wilson v. Phend, supra, said, even though the defendant
retains his own counsel, the State has obtained a conviction under such unfair circumstances as to cast doubt
on the factual basis upon which the conviction rests.
See also, for the same rule that even though counsel is
retained and not court appointed the defendant is entitled to relief if counsel was ineffective, L11nce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957); Porter v. United
States, 298 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1962); Craig i'.J. United
States, 217 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1954). These cases are
based on the reasoning best stated by \Valtz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Groun<l
for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59
N.\V.L. Rev. 289 (1964), at 299-300:
It cannot be persuasively suggested of the
Fourteenth Amendment that it is Yiolated
where the trial court has been utterly inactive
in that it failed to provide defense counsel to
an indigent person accused of a felony but is
not infringed where retained counsel's intrinsic
ineffectiveness placed the accused in a situation as bad or worse than he would have confronted had he appeared pro se. The requisite
state action is precisely the same in both instances: convicting the accused and carrying
his sentence into execution--depriving him of
his life or liberty-on the basis of a trial so
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lacking in fundamental fairness as to fail of
qualification of due process.
Thus, appellant contends that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel at his trial and so the
judgment of conviction should be set aside as invalid.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, that appellant was
without the effective assistance of counsel at his trial,
appellant respectfully submits that the judgment of the
court below be reversed with the direction that appellant be granted a writ of habeas corpus and be released
from the custody of respondent.
Respectfully submitted,

BRUCE C. LUBECK

Attorney for Appellant.

